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Abstract: This article develops an empirical measure of electoral availability, i.e., the micro 
perspective of political competition. As existing research conceptualizes political competition 
mainly as a macro- or party-level phenomenon, the micro perspective remains 
underdeveloped and, therefore, an important dimension of political competition, the 
availability of votes, is ignored. We introduce and discuss an individualized measure of 
electoral competition that is based on propensities to vote as indicators of the availability of 
voters to different political parties. The theoretical and empirical advantages of this measure 
are discussed: it is not restricted to parties’ positions but is based on multidimensional party 
evaluations; it does not only focus on actual behavior but instead on the potential behavior of 
voters; the proposed measure takes all (relevant) parties into account instead of only 
including the two largest parties; as a continuous index it avoids arbitrary cut-off points; and 
the resulting individual-level results are easily summable to obtain party- and country-level 
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Introduction 
Political competition is one of the constitutive elements of modern democracy.  
Meaningful representation and effective accountability can only be ensured if 
elections are competitive (cf. Bartolini, 1999). Dahl (1971) called this contestation
This article was published by Springer in  
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and conceived it as one necessary condition of a polyarchy. It basically refers to 
competition for political power by means of free and fair elections. Although there is 
no doubt about the necessity of competition per se, it is no easy task to theoretically 
determine an optimal level of competitiveness. Empirically, the existing level of 
competitiveness in contemporary democracies is a matter of debate. Surprisingly, 
both the party polarization in the US and the (alleged) indistinguishability of the major 
parties in Western Europe are perceived as indications of strong competitiveness. 
This reveals a lack of conceptual clarity in the meaning of the terms competition and 
competitiveness. This paper will contribute to the debate on how to measure 
competition adequately by focusing on the normatively most important actor in 
democracies: the citizen. 
The empirical literature on electoral competition can be roughly divided into two main 
groups. The first focuses on party positions and refers to the different schools of the 
spatial approach of party competition. Here, parties are said to be competing if they 
are located close to each other in the political space and/or emphasize the same 
issues. The second approach takes election results into account and regards an 
election as competitive if the difference between the winner and the loser is small. 
Conceptualized this way, it is mostly used as the independent variable to explain, 
among others, budgetary policies (Rogers and Rogers, 2000; Costa-i-Font et al, 
2003), turnout, the representativeness of an election, and campaigning efforts 
(“marginality hypothesis;” see, e.g., Kuklinski, 1977; Griffin, 2006; Bowler and 
Donovan, 2011)1. 
Although both fields of research imply a certain behavior on the part of individual 
actors, past analyses, definitions, and conceptualizations have conceived political 
competition mainly as a macro- or party-level phenomenon. The micro perspective 
on political competition, i.e., the availability dimension (Bartolini, 1999, 2000), is 
clearly underdeveloped. Therefore, in this paper we will try to answer two questions. 
Firstly, how can we adequately measure the individual dimension of competition? For 
this purpose, we will briefly discuss the literature on competition with the focus on 
voter’s availability. Until now, there are only a few conceptualizations and even fewer 
empirical attempts to measure competition on the individual, i.e., citizen level. In a 
next step, we will introduce propensities to vote, providing the basis for a measure of 
the availability of a voter to different parties. On this basis, we introduce an 
individualized measure of electoral competition and discuss its strengths and 
advantages. 
The second question raised in this paper concerns the distribution of the availability 
measure and its relation to country specifics, party characteristics, and individual 
attributes. Using the 2009 European Election Survey, we will ask: Who is available, 
to whom, and when? Thereby, we will get an idea of whose votes’ are available, of 
the characteristics of parties that have more loyal supporters, and of the contextual 
circumstances associated with more available electorates. The paper ends with an 
outlook on research questions that could be analyzed better based on such a micro-
level index of competitiveness. 
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Political Competition, Competitiveness, and Availability 
Political competition addresses the risk that rulers can be voted out of office or, more 
generally, lose their power (cf. Huntington’s (1991) idea of alternation in government 
or turnover as a test for democracies). In representative democracies, thus, elections 
are the points in time when parties and candidates compete for votes, or, more 
specifically, for the votes that are “out of competition” (Marsh, 2006, p. 78). Bartolini 
(1999, p. 438) defines competition as “a social relationship characterized by a system 
of interaction among consciously rival autonomous actors.” According to Sartori 
(1976), it is a macro feature relating mainly to institutions which, in turn, set the 
‘possibility space’ for specific levels of competitiveness at a certain point in time. This 
competitiveness is then a feature of the intermediate level of political parties (and, 
less common, other organizations). Marsh, Bartolini, and Sartori refer (in these 
quotes) to different levels to which competition is somehow conceptually connected. 
Consequently, political competition should be empirically analyzed on three levels: 
Besides looking at macro entities like political institutions, comparing, for example, 
electoral systems and debating whether majoritarian or proportional systems foster 
higher competitiveness, and at the meso level where research mostly concentrates 
on political parties2 (see below), one can focus on the individual citizens. Up to now, 
research has mainly looked at the first and especially the second level and largely 
disregarded the micro level. 
Research on the macro and on the party level can be analytically divided into two 
different strands: party-program approaches (mostly) based on spatial theory on the 
one hand and the closeness approach on the other hand. The latter looks at election 
results and regards (ex post facto) an election as competitive if the margin of victory 
is small. It mainly takes into account the difference in votes or seats between the 
winner and the first loser. The operationalization of competitiveness is rather 
straightforward: 100 minus vote or seat share difference (Jones, 2013). Thus, 
competition is seen as synonymous to a close race. Originally applied to elections in 
single-member districts, this concept has been extended to proportional 
representation systems (Blais and Lago, 2009; Grofman and Selb, 2009). Blais and 
Lago understand competitiveness as the “uncertainty in the outcome of an election” 
and suggest measuring it by “the minimal number of additional votes required for any 
party to win one additional seat” (2009, p. 94). Others propose to focus on the 
(effective) number of parties in a party system (Ashworth et al, 2008), although it 
remains unclear whether the number of parties is rather a measure of or an 
explanatory variable for competitiveness. Another related argument aims at net 
volatility: if the vote or seat shares change to a sufficient degree between two 
elections, the system is regarded as competitive (e.g., Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; 
Immergut and Abou-Chadi, 2014). According to the spatial approach, parties are
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said to be competing if they are located close to each other in an n-dimensional 
political space. This tradition goes back to, at least, Black’s Median Voter Theorem 
and Downs’ (1957) economic theory of voter and party behavior (see for a recent 
application, e.g., Akkermann, 2012). The main idea is that proximate parties are 
competing directly for the voters who are located between them. Therefore, they 
have to recalibrate their positions vis-à-vis their competitor without scaring away their 
loyal supporters. The level of competition is closely connected to the proximity of 
parties and, indirectly, to the viable options for the voters. In a comprehensive review 
of the empirical literature on strategic party positioning, Adams (2012) showed that 
parties’ behavior is indeed influenced by spatial considerations that can be best 
explained by referring to the rational-choice approach to competition. Yet, voters do 
not seem to react (or even realize) switches in party positions accordingly. One of 
Adams’ conclusions is therefore that more research needs to be done regarding 
voters’ perceptions of party competition. In any case, concerning the parties’ 
positions as well as the closeness of elections approach, these conceptions of 
competitiveness refer (sometimes implicitly, sometimes more explicitly) to a micro 
logic of individual behavior. According to Adams (2012), future research should aim 
at clarifying this nexus. And here the idea of measuring individual availability comes 
in. 
Two broader conceptualizations conceive political competition multi-dimensionally 
and on different levels of analysis. Strøm (1989) suggests distinguishing between 
three dimensions. The first, conflict of interest, refers to inter-party relationships and 
the tone of the political debate; it is closely connected to the party systems’ 
ideological polarization. Thus, it can be subsumed under the headline of the spatial 
theory of party competition. Contestability, secondly, refers to the extent to which a 
new competitor is able to challenge the existing political actors, hence, to overcome 
“legal or institutional barriers to entry,” and, thereby, refers to the electoral system 
and party finance regulations. Here, the argument is related to the closeness of the 
election approach, although mediated by the effects of the electoral system. The third 
dimension, performance sensitivity, belongs to the same category as the second. 
Here, “party competition is purely behaviorally and not institutionally defined” (Strøm, 
1989, p. 280). It relates to the uncertainty of electoral outcomes, the support of the 
government, and consequently to the undecidedness of the electorate.  
In a similar vein, Bartolini (1999, 2000) differentiates four dimensions of political 
competition: contestability, decidability, vulnerability, and availability. His dimension 
of contestability means much the same as in Strøm’s concept. Decidability resembles 
Strøm’s conflict of interest and, thus, belongs to the spatial school. Similar to Strøm’s 
performance sensitivity, the facet of vulnerability refers to the ability of voters to 
punish governments by ousting them from office. The fourth dimension is directly 
linked to the individual voter. Availability refers to the existence of potential vote 
switchers, which points to a certain amount of non- 
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aligned voters. It relates to the openness of the demand side to more than one party: 
“The availability of voters to switch their party/candidate allegiance is crucial because 
competition theory (…) assumes that a quota of voters, in large masses or in critical 
minorities, determines through their ‘potential’ defection the anticipated reactions of 
the elite and therefore their responsiveness to public opinion orientation” (Bartolini, 
1999, p. 461). It is important to stress that the level of competition is contingent on 
potential vote switching, not on actual voting shifts. Aggregate volatility – used as one 
important indicator of electoral risk by, e.g., Kayser and Lindsta¨dt (2015) – 
underestimates in nearly every case the amount of individual voting shifts, which, in 
turn, builds only a subset of the available electorate (Bartolini, 1999, p. 467). This is 
why volatility is a poor measure of competiveness. It does not measure the 
willingness of voters to switch parties. Even if all voters stick to their previous 
decision, they might have been available to other parties and, therefore, there might 
have been a highly competitive situation. On the other hand, if we observe high 
levels of volatility, there had to be availability in the first place because non-available 
voters do not change their preferred parties simply because by definition no other 
parties come into question. Therefore, volatility is not only an unreliable but even an 
invalid measure of the individual-level component of competition. 
This line of reasoning has been taken up by van der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991, pp. 
56–57): “The concept of electoral competition is, in its essence, dispositional in 
character. Consequently, the phenomenon of competition cannot be directly 
observed. Actual behavior (i.e., party choice) cannot reveal its existence.” What is 
needed, thus, is a measure of potential behavior. Van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 
suggested using propensities to vote (PTVs) to quantify vote potentials. PTVs were 
introduced into electoral research in order to grasp the conceptual complexity 
inherent in the process of preference formation and decision making, especially in 
multi-party systems. Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) suggested to analyze voting 
behavior with a measure of overall inclination toward parties that would depict the 
electoral utility of or preferences for parties in a given party system.3 Van der Eijk and 
colleagues (van der Eijk, 2002; van der Eijk et al, 2006; van der Brug et al, 2007) 
suggest to understand the electoral process as consisting of two steps. In 
accordance with a broader rational-choice approach, the first stage can be called 
preference formation. On the basis of party and individual characteristics, voters are 
thought to determine party utilities (Tillie, 1995).4 The result of this first step is, then, a 
preference order reflecting the electoral utilities. Usually, the final party choice is 
thought to be made by the decision rule of simple utility maximizing, i.e., by choosing 
the party with the highest utility (see Figure 1).  
In their empirical analysis of “European parties’ performance in electoral competition,” 
van der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991) divided the electorate of each country into three 
groups. The first group comprises voters beyond competition. Only one party is likely 
to obtain their votes (reflected by PTV scores between 8 
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Figure 1: The two-stage model of electoral choice. 
Source: van der Brug et al (2007, p. 11). 
 
and 10 on a 10-point scale) and they indicated that it is rather unlikely that they will 
vote for any other party (scores 5 or lower). The exact opposite applies to the second 
group. Those voters are subject to intense electoral competition which is reflected by 
the fact that they awarded a high score to at least 2 (possibly even more) parties. The 
remaining citizens form the third group between the two extreme cases. Building on 
the work of van der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991), Kroh et al (2007) distinguished 
between voters who are subject to intense competition and those beyond 
competition, too. Their main interest was the respective probability to switch votes.5 
They agree with van der Eijk and Oppenhuis in arguing that competition is stronger 
between parties if the voters’ preferences for those parties are at a similar level. 
These preferences are determined on the basis of PTVs, too.6 They call voters “likely 
switchers (…) who have tied first preferences or whose second preference is only 
one point less that their first” (ibid.: 212). Similarly, Marsh (2006) uses PTVs to study 
the “stability and change in the structure of electoral competition.” He differentiates 
voters into two groups: “in competition” and “out of competition,” the latter referring to 
voters with a clear preference for one party. Operationally, those are citizens for 
which the gap between their most and their next most preferred party is more than 
two points on a 10-point scale. If the difference is below three points and they give a 
high PTV (points 8–10) for at least one party, voters are categorized as “in 
competition.” 
Building on this literature, the overall party preferences of a voter – the PTVs – are 
taken as the starting point for developing a continuous measure of the availability7 of 
voters, as it mirrors how competition is perceived individually: A number of parties 
come into question, but which one should one vote for? Understood in this way, 
availability implies that more than one party is considered. If all but one party are 
perceived to be ineligible, there is no competition for this 
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person’s vote. She will just have to decide whether to vote for this party or not at all. 
Hence, a plurality of possible choices reflects the openness of the voter to different 
party offers and is understood as availability.  
One advantage of conceptualizing availability using the PTV approach is that it refers 
not only to positional arguments – parties close to each other compete – as in the 
spatial school of party competition. Instead, all factors influencing party preferences 
are considered using this overall evaluation measure. If voter A prefers a certain 
party because it is the most proximate party on some relevant policy dimension, voter 
B may make up her mind on the basis of the past performance of the government 
party, and voter C may simply decide on the basis of party-leader evaluations – in 
each case, the preference is included and depicted in the voting propensities, 
independent of the causes of these preferences.  
Therefore, the condition of an empirical theory of electoral availability, as stated by 
Bartolini (1999, p. 465), is met: “Both instrumental and expressive considerations 
should be included as influencing party preference.” This availability approach to 
competitiveness combines the ‘spatial’ with the ‘closeness’ research strand. Insofar 
as spatial considerations influence PTVs, the inclination to vote for them will be 
similar for parties that are close to each other in the policy space and the voter will be 
more or less equally available to those parties. This reflects the idea of the economic 
theory of competition on the party level: If many parties hold similar positions, 
competition is more intense because they compete for voters who are (more or less) 
equally inclined to vote for them, i.e., who are equally available. However, the 
proposed measure goes beyond spatial proximities. Party choice depends on more 
than the proximity of the voter to the party: besides long-term alignments and the 
evaluations of political leaders, valence perspectives of perceived competencies and 
past performances play a role, too. Previous studies showed that these elements are 
contained by propensities to vote (van der Eijk et al, 2006; van der Brug et al, 2007). 
Therefore, a measure of individual-level competitiveness based on PTVs is more 
comprehensive than an approach focusing exclusively on party positions. At the 
same time, such a measure includes the closeness approach. As the step from the 
electoral utilities to party choice is one of utility maximizing, as van der Eijk et al 
(2006) has shown, two parties with similar shares of top positions in the choice set 
will end up with similar vote shares, too. Equal shares of voters perceiving the parties 
as eligible should reflect a close race. The following chapter will introduce an 
empirical index of the availability of the single vote(r), understood as an individual-
level phenomenon measured via inclinations toward parties. 
 
Operationalization of Availability 
As explained above, competition on the individual level equals the fact that more than 
one party comes into consideration. A plurality of possible choices and 
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indecision about which party to vote for can be understood as availability. As a 
consequence, if a plurality of parties gains high and/or similar PTVs from a voter, he 
or she is subject to competition, because this situation implicates a higher chance 
that more than one party could gain his or her vote in future elections. The availability 
will be operationalized on the basis of the following assumptions (for simplicity, all 
PTVs are recoded to 0–1, with 0 = “no inclination whatsoever” and 1 = “very likely to 
give this party the vote”): 
 
 If two parties are rated similar, the voter’s availability is higher (PTV1 = 1 and 
PTV2 = 0.9 means higher availability compared to PTV1 = 1 and PTV2 = 0.7). 
 Ties yield always the highest possible value on this index (because minor 
changes are sufficient to change the support structure dramatically). 
 As a voter has (in most cases) only one vote, the differences of all parties to 
the most preferred party should be considered. 
 The higher the level of the respective PTVs, the higher the individual’s 
availability (PTV1 = 1 and PTV2 = 0.9 compared to PTV1 = 0.5 and PTV2 = 
0.4). 
 
Fortunately, there is a simple transformation of PTVs and their differences which 
fulfills those conditions. If we consider two PTVs with PTV1 ≥ PTV2 then 
 
Availability1, 2 = 1 – (√𝑃𝑇𝑉 1 – √𝑃𝑇𝑉2). 
 
Under the same condition (PTVmax ≥ PTVn), the measure for all parties of a given 
party system with n parties equals 
 
Availability = ∑ 1 − (√𝑃𝑇𝑉  
𝑛
2
max – √𝑃𝑇𝑉n). 
 
 
Consider as an example the following four voters with the respective voting 
propensities for three parties (Table 1). 
Voter A is completely undecided and available to all three hypothetical parties as he 
has an equally strong inclination to all of them. Voter B, in contrast, has made up her 
mind. She will vote for Party 1 and no other party comes into question. 
Table 1: Examples of PTVs and Availability Scores 
Voter PTV party 1 PTV party 2 PTV party 3 Availability 
A 1 1 1 2.0 
B 1 0 0 0.0 
C 1 1 0.4 1.6 
D 0.8 0.8 0.4 1.7 
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Consequently, voter A has an availability score of 2.0 and voter B a score of zero. 
Voter C is undecided between parties 1 and 2 and rather skeptical about party 3. 
Parties 1 and 2 got the maximum voting propensity, leading to an availability score  
of 1.6: the intuitive interpretation might be that he thinks about voting for about one 
and a half other parties than his most preferred party. Voter D resembles voter C but 
she is not as enthusiastic about these parties as voter C. As the difference between 
the most preferred parties and party 3 is smaller, this leads to a slightly higher 
availability score of 1.7. The range of this measure is between zero (a voter is well 
beyond competition and not available on the electoral market) and n - 1 for a voter 
who answers that all parties running for election have a high chance of winning her or 
his vote and who is, therefore, very much available for all parties of the respective 
party system.8 
The index proposed here has several advantages compared to other measures of 
competition and to similar measures of availability. It is theoretically rooted in 
Bartolini’s multidimensional and multilevel concept of competition and focuses on the 
normatively most important actor in democracies: the citizen. It does not take just one 
element of party preferences as decisive, as do spatial and other issue approaches 
(be it proximity or directional, saliency or issue-ownership models) that view party 
preferences as being determined by relative issue importance and relative issue 
position. Rather, the measure uses utilities that result from multidimensional 
evaluations of parties. At the same time, it does not only take actual behavior into 
account. Instead of such an ex post perspective, the availability measure is built on 
potential behavior. Therefore, the suggested measure includes the advantage of 
considering multiple sources of party support (as does the closeness approach of an 
election’s competitiveness) and the advantage of focusing on potential instead of 
actual behavior (as does the spatial approach of party competition). Furthermore, the 
proposed availability measure is a continuous measure, not a categorical or binary 
variable. As a result, it avoids arbitrary thresholds and prevents information losses. 
Additionally, all (relevant) parties are taken into account when calculating the index, 
not only the two most preferred parties. This reflects the intuition that voters who are 
undecided between four parties make a difference for party competition compared to 
voters who are undecided between only two parties. The availability index can be 
measured over the whole electoral cycle, not only at election day (as the closeness 
and the volatility measure). This represents the fact that competition does not stop 
after the election. Lastly, by focusing on the micro level, it is possible to aggregate to 
higher levels (like parties and countries). Whenever competition is measured on the 
party or country level, disaggregation to lower levels (i.e., the citizen level) is hardly 
possible. But we can (and will in the next section) aggregate to the party level by 
taking the average availability of the party’s voters and thereby be able to discuss 
which party is especially vulnerable and which party has loyal supporters and is, 
therefore, more secure from losing in an upcoming election. On the country level, 
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we can compare the average availability of different countries with different political 
institutions or the same country at two points in time to see whether the electorate 
has become more available and de-aligned. First steps of such an endeavor will be 
presented in the next section. 
 
Empirical Distribution of Electoral Availability in the EU-27 
To present the empirical properties of our index, we will use data from the 2009 
European Election study van Egmond et al (2013). As argued above, one advantage 
of conceptualizing and measuring levels of competitiveness on the individual level is 
that it is possible to aggregate to higher levels. If one starts at the macro or at the 
party level, disaggregation to individual micro foundations cannot be done so easily. 
By summing up the availability scores of voters for a certain party, however, one gets 
the reliability or stability of the party’s electorate. Tillie (1995) presented a way to 
build a measure of competitiveness based on PTVs on the level of interparty 
competition and showed how to aggregate these measures to the national level. By 
starting measuring on the individual level, one is able to aggregate to both, the party 
or the national level of an election’s competitiveness. Consequently, we will present 
not only the availability score for the individuals, but also for the parties and 
countries. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the availability of votes for respondents from the 27 
member countries of the European Union in 2009. There is a large amount of 
variation between the voters in Europe: For about 9 per cent of the voters, it is 




Figure 2: Distribution of the availability measure. 
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and strongly preferred party. For the remaining about 90 per cent the choice is less 
clear. The overall mean of the availability measure is about 2.7 and the median about 
2.6. 
As a second step, we will present the conditional distribution of voter’s availability. On 
the individual level, we are interested in the relationship between availability and (a) 
partisanship, (b) the citizen’s political position, (c) the probability to turn out at the 
next election, and (d) intended vote switching. It is worth mentioning, however, that 
we are not proposing a uniform causal connection between availability and the other 
variables. Whereas party identification and a rather extreme political positioning most 
probably make a person less available on the electoral market and are, therefore, 
explanatory factors for the availability score, an individual’s availability in turn should 
have an impact on the probability of vote switching and turning out on election day. 
Therefore, availability can be conceived as a dependent variable influenced by, 
among others, political attitudes and social-psychological predispositions and as an 
independent variable influencing political behavior. Obviously, this relates not only to 
individual-level factors but to aspects of parties and party systems as well. On the 
country level, a clear causal path might not be identifiable. On the one hand, the 
number and polarization of parties might influence availability. On the other hand, the 
party system is largely a result of voting decisions. If voters are not open to 
alternative parties, new challengers will find it hard to establish themselves in the 
electoral arena and there will be less party system fragmentation. The causal arrow 
between party system characteristics and availability should therefore run in both 
directions. Clarifying the specific causal status of availability would go beyond the 
scope of this paper. Our aim here is more modest: to show how the proposed 
measure correlates with important political macro, meso, and micro characteristics. 
Specifically, we assume that citizens who identify with a certain party (as do 50 per 
cent of the respondents in the EES dataset) are less available on the electoral market 
(see Bartolini, 1999, p. 466). As partisanship is supposed to be a long-term stable 
and strong affinity toward one party, a partisan should not be thinking about voting for 
another party. Secondly, voters right in the middle of the ideological spectrum (who 
are thus closer to or with a higher probability the median voter) should show higher 
availability scores as they have a broader choice menu than voters who locate 
themselves at the poles of the political spectrum. We used the absolute distance of 
ego’s self-placement to the midpoint of the left–right scale as a measure of extremity. 
Furthermore, as we know that one determinant of non-voting is the individual’s 
indifference between several parties (see, e.g., Thurner and Eymann, 2000), we 
assume that citizens who tend not to turn out on election day (33.5 per cent indicated 
they do not plan to take part in the next national election) are supposed to be less 
sure who they want to vote for and have a higher availability. The same is true for 
floating voters: a higher availability score should lead to a higher probability to vote 
for different parties in different elections 
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Figure 3: Individual differences in electoral availability 
 
(9.2 per cent indicated different party choices for the last and the next national 
election). When several parties seem attractive to the voter, s/he will vote for one 
party in one election and for another in the following one. Equally, s/he might be 
more inclined to switch between voting and non-voting (as do 22.6 per cent in the 
sample). As Figure 3 shows, all these four bivariate hypotheses are supported by the 
data (the dashed horizontal line indicates the mean availability in the complete 
sample). Partisans’ availability score is one whole point lower than that nonpartisans 
and voters show to be about 0.6 points more available – both differences are highly 
significant (p < 0.001; cluster-corrected standard errors, clustered by country; socio-
demographic weights applied). The availability scores of citizens who place 
themselves in the center of the political sphere (distance to the midpoint of the 11-
point left–right scale < 3) are significantly above average and higher than those of 
citizens farther to the right or left (> 3 points from the midpoint). Voters who 
supported the same party in the last national election as they intend to support in the 
next national election exhibit a lower electoral availability than vote switchers, 
irrespective of whether those switch between parties or between voting and non-
voting. 
Different parties have voters of different loyalty. While some parties’ voters are 
beyond competition and show a very low availability score, other parties have to
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compete for their voters more intensively. As the left panel of Figure 4 shows, the 
average availability of the party voters (measured via national vote intention) ranges 
from 0.62 for the Nationalist Party in Malta to 4.58 for the Democrats 66 in the 
Netherlands.9 Whereas the voters of the Maltese National Party can be characterized 
as extraordinary loyal, the Party Democrats 66 is in a highly competitive situation. 
The mean value for all parties is 2.41 and the median 2.49. 
The spatial approach to electoral competition predicts that party competition should 
be most intense in the center where the median voter is located. Looking at the 
average availability of the voters of a party dependent on the respective party’ s 
position, we hypothesize that voters of parties in the center are more available to 
other parties, too. As the right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows, this relationship holds 
with the EES data: the voters of parties in the center (measured via the perceived 
average distance to the midpoint of the left–right scale) are more likely subject to 
competition than voters of extreme parties (r = −0.35; p < 0.01, cluster-corrected 
standard errors, clustered by country). 
On the country or party system level, we will analyze the correlation of the country 
mean of availability and two indicators: the number of parties and the polarization of 
the party system (see, e.g., Kroh et al, 2007). As a matter of course, the values of the 
availability measure depend somewhat on the number of parties. Obviously, more 
choice options (and therefore most often more differentiated 
 
 
Figure 4: Average availability score of party voters by party. 
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options) provide the opportunity for more than one party to come into question, 
thereby leading to higher levels of availability. This corresponds with a finding on the 
meaningfulness of elections (Weßels and Schmitt, 2008): A larger number of 
electoral choice options leads on average to a wider policy range of political offers 
and, therefore, to a higher chance for a voter to find a proximate party. Insofar as 
proximity corresponds to vote propensity, more choice options should lead to more 
available voters. Secondly, polarization should be negatively related to availability. 
When parties are dispersed across the political spectrum, is it less likely that different 
parties can attract the same voters at the same time. Conversely, when parties are 
located close to each other, their support base might overlap and each vote will be 
available to more than one party. 
Figure 5 shows the mean availability per country. In general, we find a lot of variation 
between the European countries. In Malta with its two-party system, the average 
availability is about one. The average Maltese citizen considers only two parties as 
possible choices. In the Netherlands, on the other extreme, the mean availability 
score reaches 4.5, implying an electorate very open to the parties’ mobilization and 
campaigning attempts. 
A closer look at the distribution shows that this is not simply a random pattern. Figure 
6 shows the very strong and significant relationship between the availability scores 
and the number of parties (r = 0.89, p < 0.001; left panel) on the one hand and the 
party systems’ polarization (right panel; r = −0.37; p < 0.10) on the other 
 
 
Figure 5: Average availability score per country.  
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Figure 6: Availability and the number of parties and polarization. 
 
 
Table 2: Electoral availability and individual, party, and party system characteristics 
 Assumed correlation with availability Empirical results 
Party systems level   
     Number of parties + +0.89*** 
     Polarization − −0.37* 
Party level   
     Centrist position + +0.16*** 
Individual level   
     Party identification − −0.98*** 
     Turnout − −0.60*** 
     Switching (Ref = same party) + +0.30*** (different party)  
+ 0.36 (voter/non-voter) 
     Centrist position + +0.21*** 
 
Notes: * p > 0.10; ** p > 0.05; *** p > 0.01 (two-tailed test). 
hand. This correlation stays significant even after controlling for the number of 
parties. Availability is lower in more polarized countries and higher in countries with a 
higher number of parties. Table 2 gives a summary of the theoretically assumed and 
empirical relationships of availability and the seven measures on the individual, party, 
and party system levels.  
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Conclusion and Outlook 
By competing for political power, parties produce socially desirable ends like 
accountability and responsiveness (cf. Bartolini 1999, p. 442). Related to this, voters 
strengthen democracy by remaining open to a plurality of political parties because 
meaningful party competition can only emerge if a certain amount of voters is 
available on the electoral market. In this paper, we discussed the levels of 
conceptualizations of political competition and pointed to the lack of an individual-
level definition and measurement of competitiveness. The section “Political 
Competition, Competitiveness, and Availability” introduced such an individual-level 
measure – availability – by focusing on the inclination of voters to different parties. 
This measure can serve as a micro foundation of both dominant ‘schools’ of empirical 
research on electoral competition – party positions and issue stances on the one 
hand and closeness of electoral results and volatility on the other hand. Building on 
the theoretical work of Bartolini (1999, 2000) and the empirical work especially of van 
der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991) and Kroh et al (2007), propensities to vote (PTVs) 
were used to construct an index of the availability of votes. The main advantages of 
this measure are as follows: it is not restricted to parties’ positions but is based 
instead on multidimensional party evaluations; it does not only focus on actual 
behavior but theoretically more appropriately on the potential behavior of voters that 
has to be taken into account by parties; as competition does not only take place 
between the largest and the second largest party, the proposed measure considers 
the voter’s evaluation of all (relevant) parties and is not restricted to the two largest 
parties only; as a continuous index it avoids arbitrary cut-off points; and the resulting 
individual-level results are easily summable to obtain party- and country-level values. 
This index showed variance between citizens, parties, and countries. On the 
individual-level vote switching, the absence of a party identification, more centrist 
positions in the political space and not turning out at an election are positively 
correlated with higher levels of availability. Regarding the parties’ positions, it was 
shown that extreme parties have electorates that are less available to other parties. 
On the party system level, the numbers of parties and polarization have been found 
to covary significantly with an aggregated index of availability. For some of the 
variables, the causal link between availability and the respective variable seem rather 
obvious, but a complete causal model was beyond the scope of this article. 
One of the several further questions that could be approached using electoral 
availability as a micro measure of competitiveness relates to the institutional 
environment of the voters: our availability measure focuses on preference formation 
and the final choice. As the literature on electoral systems suggests, the effects of 
vote distributions on the opportunities for parties to gain political power correlate with 
the electoral system’s proportionality. Whereas a minor shift 
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in proportional representation systems results in a minor shift of seat share, the same 
amount of vote shift may result in a major change of legislative seats or none at all 
under single-member plurality systems. Thus, the effects of electoral availability do 
not have to be the same under different institutional designs. Additionally, we should 
ask where differences in the levels of electoral availability come from. Similarly, we 
need to clarify the differences between voters under identical electoral and party 
systems: Which voting decision is safe, whose vote is still available for two (or more) 
parties – and why? Lastly, are there party-specific patterns and how can they be 
explained? Why do have some parties exceptionally ‘loyal’ supporters and which 
parties have to live with a more volatile voting basis? On the basis of a theoretically 
grounded empirical measure of electoral availability, we will be able to ask and more 
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1 For an analysis of the perception of competitiveness, see Huckfeldt et al (2007) who find that only 
sophisticated voters assess the degree of closeness correctly. 
2 Especially in parliamentary systems with only a single chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000), parties 
are the main actors of political supply. In presidential systems, individual political entrepreneurs are 
sometimes more important. The following argument refers mostly to parliaments and to a lesser 
degree to the presidential arena. 
3 As a survey item, a 10- or 11-point scale is found to measure this electoral attractiveness of each 
party appropriately (Tillie, 1995). The question reads normally as follows: “How probable is it that 
you will ever give your vote to the following parties? Please use the numbers on this scale to 
indicate your views, where ‘1’ means ‘not at all probable’ and ‘11’ means ‘very probable’’’. 
4 Already the Downsian argument that a voter will give her vote to the party she likes most includes 
the possibility that the voter could prefer more than one party to some degree (van der Brug et al, 
2007, p. 11). Analyses of the complete choice set may therefore be a better application of the 
Downsian approach. 
5 Actually, most individual-level analyses of vote switching imply such a perspective on availability. 
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6 Whereas vote choices are discrete and ipsative—if one votes for party A, one cannot vote for Party 
B or C-, PTVs are not. They depict two characteristics of preferences that may be gradual and non-
ipsative. Van der Eijk and Marsh (2007) show that PTVs are unequal to like-dislike scores or 
feeling thermometers. For a discussion of advantages of the PTV measures and empirical analyses 
using them, see (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; van der Eijk, 2002; van der Eijk et al, 2006; van 
der Brug et al, 2007; Lachat, 2009; Blais and St-Vincent, 2011). 
7 In the following, the term “availability” is used synonymously to “micro-level measure of 
competition”. 
8 A way to standardize this measure for availability is to divide it by n − 1. Therefore, the effect of the 
number of choice options (i.e., parties) is subtracted out of the measure. I thank one anonymous 
reviewer for this suggestion. Theoretically, though, more choice options provide the opportunity for 
more parties coming into question, thereby leading to higher levels of availability. It is worth noting, 
however, that the shape of the distribution of the measure, the correlations between availability and 
individual- and party-level characteristics presented later in this paper, and those between 
availability and party system polarization stay substantively the same (results not presented here). 
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